Part 1
The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union-which, from 1781 to 1789, provided the first framework for the new nation-were as emblematic of the early Americans' fondness for managerial mishmash as they were evidentiary of Americans' insistence on administrative constraint. The relatively scant attention the Articles pay to such notions as matching accountability with authority and specialized divisions of public labor(notably in their disinclination to distinguish legislative responsibilities from executive responsibilities in the government's structure) no doubt was the product not only of a grassroots revulsion with princely prerogatives, but equally of the nation's early political thinkers wrestling with the dilemma of how to organize something truly new: big democracy. Because the nation's first charter had to account for a vast territory and a large population, it somehow needed to be devised so that it could transcend the only governmental from that democracy had ever used before, the town meeting. Unfortunately, the Articles of Confederation did not meet this historic challenge.
1781至1789年的联邦条款为新的国家提供了最初的框架。他体现了早期美国人对管理混合体的喜爱，也显示了美国人固执地强调行政的约束性。它很少注意到诸如权利与责任的匹配和公职的专门分工（主要表现为不愿意将政府体制中的立法职能与行政职能区分开来）等问题。毫无疑问，这不仅表现了植根于大众的、对贵族的反感，同样也表现出美国早期政治思想家在解决如何组织一个全新的体制——庞大的民主体制——这一问题所面临的困惑。美国的第一部宪法必须考虑到广大的领土和众多的人口，所以它在某种程度上必须超越民主体制在此之前所使用的唯一一种形式——镇民大会。遗憾的是，联邦条款未能胜任历史的挑战。
Part 2
When Daniel Shays ignited his ill-conceived Rebellion in 1786 (the country’s first tax revolt),the nation’s political leaders discovered that no arm of “American government,” such as it was, had been authorized or organized to put down the disturbance, and eventually that chore fell to the Massachusetts state militia. At least one petulant English observer foresaw the impossibility, as demonstrated by Shays’ Rebellion, of his former colonies to ever found a government worthy of the name, and he attributed this failure to Americans’ fixation on a weak executive:” As to the future grandeur of America, and its being a rising empire under one head, whether Republican or Monarchial, it is one of the idlest and most visionary notions that was ever conceived even by writers of romance.
1786年丹尼尔·谢斯发动狂妄的威士忌叛乱（美国的第一次税收反抗）时，美国的政治领袖发现当时的“美国政府”既没有授权，也没有组织任何部门来平息叛乱。这一任务最终落到了马萨诸塞州民兵的肩上。至少有一位性急的英国观察家预言说，谢斯的反叛表明这些英国的前殖民地不可能建立起一个名副其实的政府，他把这一点归因于美国人固执的坚持要一个软弱无力的行政首长：至于谈到美国未来的辉煌，谈到她在一个领袖的领导下成为新兴的帝国——不管是共和制还是君主制——即使小说家也会认为这是一个最想入非非的想法。
Part 3
The eleven states that adopted constitutions were notably aggressive in limiting the
powers of the chief executive. Only New York’s constitution (with that of Massachusetts running a distant second) provided a reasonably strong executive, and the remaining constitutions severely restricted their chief executives’ appointment and veto powers. The governor in these nine states amounted to little more than a military commander, and all executive and most judicial powers-as well as legislative authority- were placed firmly within the legislatures; these states determinedly ignored the notion that their governments and people might benefit from the presence of an empowered executive. In face, ten of the thirteen original states had gubernatorial terms of only a single year.
通过了宪法的11个州都明显的限制了行政首长的权力。只有纽约州（马萨诸塞州也勉强算的上）赋予行政首长相当大的权力。剩下9个州的宪法各自严格限制了行政首长的任命权和否决权。这9个州的州长不过相当于军队指挥官而已，所有的行政权及大部分的司法权仍被立法机构牢牢的掌握着。这些州都断然否认享有实权的行政首长会有助于政府和人民。实际上，最初的13个州中有10个州的州长任期只有1年。
Part 4
It might appear to some that the absence of authority granted by the Articles of Confederation to the national government, and the virtual absence of authority provided by the great majority of the original state constitutions to elected or appointed state constitutions to elected or appointed state administrators, were pioneering testaments to true, populist, and “natural” democracy. Hardly. Passing few people (an average of about 6 percent) were allowed to vote on anything or anyone in any of the states, and only three states (Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New York) permitted their chief executives to even be elected independently by those few people who were qualified to vote; in the remaining ten states, governors were named by the legislature or judiciary. In only one state, Massachusetts, were the people permitted to ratify their own state’s constitution by popular vote. Democracy was not only new-it was distrusted. Constrained public administrators, in other words, do not necessarily equate with healthy democracy.
联邦条款拒绝赋予联邦政府权力，绝大部分州宪法实际上拒绝赋予民选或任命的行政首长以权力——在有些人看来，这些都是真正的、平民的、自然的、民主的开创性表现。其实并非如此。只有很少的人（平均6%）能够参加选举或在任何一个州中表决任何事情或是推选任何一个人，而且只有3个州（马萨诸塞、新罕布什尔和纽约）让有选举权的少数人独立选举行政首长。只有一个州（马萨诸塞州）其宪法是有公民投票批准的。民主不仅是一个新生事物——它还遭遇到了人们的不信任。换言之，对公共行政官员的约束并不一定就等同于健康的民主。
Part 5
Of Hamilton, an eminent scholar has written, “If anyone deserves a title as the founder of the American administrative state…it is……Alexander Hamilton.” Perhaps. But Hamilton, brilliant though he was, nonetheless rejected as intellectually tenuous and administratively debilitating many of the basic cultural values of his new nation as they pertained to the conduct of public administration. It may be arguable that Hamilton was the founder of the profession (that is, a self-aware field of study and practice) of public administration in the United States. But it is to Jefferson that credit must be given as the founder of the tradition of
American public administration. It was Jefferson who, by his eloquent articulation of what he believed to be the transcendent goodness of the average American, gave intellectual credence to those currents in the American political culture that have resulted in the lasting American political culture that have resulted in the lasting American tradition of constrained public management. It is tradition against which Hamilton’s professional and academic progeny still war.
对于汉密尔顿，一个著名的学者曾这样写道：如果有一个人能被称为美国行政的鼻祖的话，他就是亚历山大·汉密尔顿。或许如此。然而，尽管汉密尔顿非常有天才，但是人们指责他思想肤浅，有意削弱了这个新生国家不少与公共行政运作有关的文化价值观。是否可以这样说，汉密尔顿是美国公共行政职业（一个独立的研究与实践领域）的创始人，而杰斐逊是美国公共行政传统的创始人。杰斐逊这位杰出的美国人相信，普通美国人具有超越的善，通过对自己的信念坚定不移的辩护，确立了美国政治文化中一直流传至今的许多潮流，并建立了美国的约束公共行政的持久传统。这个传统与汉密尔顿在职业和学术上的继承人仍在斗争之中。
Part 6
A social contract is an agreement, often more understood than expressed, between the citizens and the state that defines and limits the duties and responsibilities of each. For example, one anthropologist describes certain early African governmental structures as “half enlarged household, half embryonic state,” emphasizing the familial nature of the African social contract. In Asia, a foundation of Confucian philosophy has supported a social contract that, in many nations, legitimates the head of both government and society as a highly authoritative, compassionate, and wise father figure. And in Europe, the contract is a covenant, subject to adjustment, in which those who govern and those who are governed are seen as equal partners.
社会契约是国家和公民之间心照不宣的约定，它定义并非限制了国家和公民的权利和义务。例如，一个人类学家是这样形容早期非洲的政府结构的：“一半是庞大的家族，一半是国家的雏形。”它强调了非洲的社会契约的家族性。在亚洲，儒家哲学所建立的社会契约把政府和社会的领袖视为权威、慈悲而明智的父亲。在欧洲，社会契约是可修订的公约，统治者和被统治者视为平等的合作者。
Part 7
When the quintessential Washington insider-someone whom we assume knows more than most about how to “work the system”-seriously contends that razing the nation’s constitutional and governmental structure and building anew is the only cure for a sclerotic democracy, we may reasonably infer that we have a grave problem. Cutler, however, accurately describes the problem, but mistakenly ascribes its cause to what is really a symptom. The American tendency to govern by gridlock is less a consequence of an outdated Constitution and more the product of the still-vigorous political culture that wrote it. Scrapping the Constitution, as Cutler advocates, will not change the reality of an administrative and political tradition in which frustration seems the only constant.
当这个出众的政治内行（我们假设他比大家对这个系统的运作了解的更清楚）主张推倒现有的国家宪法和政府机构，而建立一个新的，并认为这是解决僵
化的民主政治的唯一药方时，我们可以合理的推断，我们遇到了一个严重问题，卡特勒准确地描述了这个问题，然而却把问题的一个表象当成了原因。给政府加上的枷锁与其说是一部过时的宪法的产物，不如说是一种仍然有活力的政治文化的产物。卡特勒所倡导的推倒整个宪法，并不能改变经常让人沮丧的行政和政治传统。
Part 8
In the states, governors have gained executive power over the last two centuries, but by any normal criterion of management their powers remain tightly constrained and fragmented. In nineteen of the forty-two states with lieutenant governors, the governor and lieutenant governor are elected independently, and, presumably, have political agendas that differ.(The nation relieved the federal government of this strange arrangement, as it applied to the president and vice president, in 1804 by ratifying the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution.) Of the almost 2,000 major administrative officers in the fifty states, nearly 300 are elected directly by the people, and an additional 750 are appointed by someone or some body other than the governor. More than half of the key public administrators in the states, in other words, administer from power bases that are independent from their state’s chief executive officer.
在州一级，州长在过去两个世纪中获得了许多行政权力，但是，从通常的行政标准来看，他们的权力仍然是受到严重限制的、分散的。在42个州中有19个州州长和副州长独立选举，而且，据推测这有不同的政治议程（国家免除了这种奇怪的安排，因为在1804年第十二次宪法修正案批准适用于总统和副总统）。在50个州的大约2000个主要行政官员中，大约300人直接由人民选出，另外750人为州长以外的人或机构任命。换言之，州的重要行政职位有一半以上独立于各州的行政首长。
Part 9
And these independent administrators are vital, concentrating as they do on elections, crime, finances, and economics. In forty-five states the people elect the state’s attorney general; about three-fourths of the fifty states elect secretaries of state (who are responsible for the conduct of elections, among other duties) and state treasurers; half elect state auditors (who can easily embarrass a governor through unflattering audits); a third elect comptrollers (who control state funds) and superintendents of education (education accounts for over half of a typical state’s budget); about a fourth elect commissioners of agriculture; roughly a fifth elect utility commissioners or board members and insurance commissioners; and a tenth elect land commissioners. These are crucial state administrators over whom governors have scant if any administrative control.
而这些独立的行政专员是至关重要的，因为他们集中在选举，犯罪，金融办和经济学。50个州之中，大约3/4的州选举司库和州务卿（后者的工作之一是负责选举事务），1/2的州选举州审计师（他们可以通过不徇私情审计轻而易举的使州长处于尴尬的境地），1/3的州选举审计长（他们控制州的资金）及督学（教育经费一般占州预算的一半）,1/4的州选举农业专员，约1/5的州选举公用事业专员和保险专员，1/10的州选举土地专员。对这些州的关键行政职位，州长只有极少的合法行政控制力。
Part 10
Counties have even weaker chief executives. Nearly four-fifths(78 percent) are not elected by voters but by county commissioners, thereby depriving them of a power base independent of the legislature. Fifty-eight percent of these executives have teems of only a single year, and 92 percent have no veto power. A primitive form of early American government, in which the executive and legislative functions are combined, is continued in about two-thirds of the counties (in contrast to less than 2 percent of municipalities), where the commission plan is used; in the commission form of government, legislators directly administer government departments ,and there is no separation of the branches. Like the states, almost all counties further diminish executive power by letting the people elect a number of administrative officers, such as sheriffs, district attorneys, tax assessors and collectors, treasurers and auditors, and even coroners and clerks.
县行政首长的权力更弱，近4/5（78%）的县长是由县专员而不是由选民选举产生的，从而剥夺了权力基础，他们的立法机关独立。58%的县长只有一年的任期，而且92%没有否决权。监察委员会计划大约三分之二的县（相比之下只有不到直辖市的2%）继续用这种行政和立法职能相结合这样的一个早期美国政府原始形式。在政府委托的形式下，立法会议员直接管理的政府部门没有树枝分离。像美国，几乎所有的县进一步削弱了让人民选出的行政人员，如司法长官，地方检察官，税务评估人员和收藏家，司库及核数师，甚至法医，文员。
Part 1
The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union-which, from 1781 to 1789, provided the first framework for the new nation-were as emblematic of the early Americans' fondness for managerial mishmash as they were evidentiary of Americans' insistence on administrative constraint. The relatively scant attention the Articles pay to such notions as matching accountability with authority and specialized divisions of public labor(notably in their disinclination to distinguish legislative responsibilities from executive responsibilities in the government's structure) no doubt was the product not only of a grassroots revulsion with princely prerogatives, but equally of the nation's early political thinkers wrestling with the dilemma of how to organize something truly new: big democracy. Because the nation's first charter had to account for a vast territory and a large population, it somehow needed to be devised so that it could transcend the only governmental from that democracy had ever used before, the town meeting. Unfortunately, the Articles of Confederation did not meet this historic challenge.
1781至1789年的联邦条款为新的国家提供了最初的框架。他体现了早期美国人对管理混合体的喜爱，也显示了美国人固执地强调行政的约束性。它很少注意到诸如权利与责任的匹配和公职的专门分工（主要表现为不愿意将政府体制中的立法职能与行政职能区分开来）等问题。毫无疑问，这不仅表现了植根于大众的、对贵族的反感，同样也表现出美国早期政治思想家在解决如何组织一个全新的体制——庞大的民主体制——这一问题所面临的困惑。美国的第一部宪法必须考虑到广大的领土和众多的人口，所以它在某种程度上必须超越民主体制在此之前所使用的唯一一种形式——镇民大会。遗憾的是，联邦条款未能胜任历史的挑战。
Part 2
When Daniel Shays ignited his ill-conceived Rebellion in 1786 (the country’s first tax revolt),the nation’s political leaders discovered that no arm of “American government,” such as it was, had been authorized or organized to put down the disturbance, and eventually that chore fell to the Massachusetts state militia. At least one petulant English observer foresaw the impossibility, as demonstrated by Shays’ Rebellion, of his former colonies to ever found a government worthy of the name, and he attributed this failure to Americans’ fixation on a weak executive:” As to the future grandeur of America, and its being a rising empire under one head, whether Republican or Monarchial, it is one of the idlest and most visionary notions that was ever conceived even by writers of romance.
1786年丹尼尔·谢斯发动狂妄的威士忌叛乱（美国的第一次税收反抗）时，美国的政治领袖发现当时的“美国政府”既没有授权，也没有组织任何部门来平息叛乱。这一任务最终落到了马萨诸塞州民兵的肩上。至少有一位性急的英国观察家预言说，谢斯的反叛表明这些英国的前殖民地不可能建立起一个名副其实的政府，他把这一点归因于美国人固执的坚持要一个软弱无力的行政首长：至于谈到美国未来的辉煌，谈到她在一个领袖的领导下成为新兴的帝国——不管是共和制还是君主制——即使小说家也会认为这是一个最想入非非的想法。
Part 3
The eleven states that adopted constitutions were notably aggressive in limiting the
powers of the chief executive. Only New York’s constitution (with that of Massachusetts running a distant second) provided a reasonably strong executive, and the remaining constitutions severely restricted their chief executives’ appointment and veto powers. The governor in these nine states amounted to little more than a military commander, and all executive and most judicial powers-as well as legislative authority- were placed firmly within the legislatures; these states determinedly ignored the notion that their governments and people might benefit from the presence of an empowered executive. In face, ten of the thirteen original states had gubernatorial terms of only a single year.
通过了宪法的11个州都明显的限制了行政首长的权力。只有纽约州（马萨诸塞州也勉强算的上）赋予行政首长相当大的权力。剩下9个州的宪法各自严格限制了行政首长的任命权和否决权。这9个州的州长不过相当于军队指挥官而已，所有的行政权及大部分的司法权仍被立法机构牢牢的掌握着。这些州都断然否认享有实权的行政首长会有助于政府和人民。实际上，最初的13个州中有10个州的州长任期只有1年。
Part 4
It might appear to some that the absence of authority granted by the Articles of Confederation to the national government, and the virtual absence of authority provided by the great majority of the original state constitutions to elected or appointed state constitutions to elected or appointed state administrators, were pioneering testaments to true, populist, and “natural” democracy. Hardly. Passing few people (an average of about 6 percent) were allowed to vote on anything or anyone in any of the states, and only three states (Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New York) permitted their chief executives to even be elected independently by those few people who were qualified to vote; in the remaining ten states, governors were named by the legislature or judiciary. In only one state, Massachusetts, were the people permitted to ratify their own state’s constitution by popular vote. Democracy was not only new-it was distrusted. Constrained public administrators, in other words, do not necessarily equate with healthy democracy.
联邦条款拒绝赋予联邦政府权力，绝大部分州宪法实际上拒绝赋予民选或任命的行政首长以权力——在有些人看来，这些都是真正的、平民的、自然的、民主的开创性表现。其实并非如此。只有很少的人（平均6%）能够参加选举或在任何一个州中表决任何事情或是推选任何一个人，而且只有3个州（马萨诸塞、新罕布什尔和纽约）让有选举权的少数人独立选举行政首长。只有一个州（马萨诸塞州）其宪法是有公民投票批准的。民主不仅是一个新生事物——它还遭遇到了人们的不信任。换言之，对公共行政官员的约束并不一定就等同于健康的民主。
Part 5
Of Hamilton, an eminent scholar has written, “If anyone deserves a title as the founder of the American administrative state…it is……Alexander Hamilton.” Perhaps. But Hamilton, brilliant though he was, nonetheless rejected as intellectually tenuous and administratively debilitating many of the basic cultural values of his new nation as they pertained to the conduct of public administration. It may be arguable that Hamilton was the founder of the profession (that is, a self-aware field of study and practice) of public administration in the United States. But it is to Jefferson that credit must be given as the founder of the tradition of
American public administration. It was Jefferson who, by his eloquent articulation of what he believed to be the transcendent goodness of the average American, gave intellectual credence to those currents in the American political culture that have resulted in the lasting American political culture that have resulted in the lasting American tradition of constrained public management. It is tradition against which Hamilton’s professional and academic progeny still war.
对于汉密尔顿，一个著名的学者曾这样写道：如果有一个人能被称为美国行政的鼻祖的话，他就是亚历山大·汉密尔顿。或许如此。然而，尽管汉密尔顿非常有天才，但是人们指责他思想肤浅，有意削弱了这个新生国家不少与公共行政运作有关的文化价值观。是否可以这样说，汉密尔顿是美国公共行政职业（一个独立的研究与实践领域）的创始人，而杰斐逊是美国公共行政传统的创始人。杰斐逊这位杰出的美国人相信，普通美国人具有超越的善，通过对自己的信念坚定不移的辩护，确立了美国政治文化中一直流传至今的许多潮流，并建立了美国的约束公共行政的持久传统。这个传统与汉密尔顿在职业和学术上的继承人仍在斗争之中。
Part 6
A social contract is an agreement, often more understood than expressed, between the citizens and the state that defines and limits the duties and responsibilities of each. For example, one anthropologist describes certain early African governmental structures as “half enlarged household, half embryonic state,” emphasizing the familial nature of the African social contract. In Asia, a foundation of Confucian philosophy has supported a social contract that, in many nations, legitimates the head of both government and society as a highly authoritative, compassionate, and wise father figure. And in Europe, the contract is a covenant, subject to adjustment, in which those who govern and those who are governed are seen as equal partners.
社会契约是国家和公民之间心照不宣的约定，它定义并非限制了国家和公民的权利和义务。例如，一个人类学家是这样形容早期非洲的政府结构的：“一半是庞大的家族，一半是国家的雏形。”它强调了非洲的社会契约的家族性。在亚洲，儒家哲学所建立的社会契约把政府和社会的领袖视为权威、慈悲而明智的父亲。在欧洲，社会契约是可修订的公约，统治者和被统治者视为平等的合作者。
Part 7
When the quintessential Washington insider-someone whom we assume knows more than most about how to “work the system”-seriously contends that razing the nation’s constitutional and governmental structure and building anew is the only cure for a sclerotic democracy, we may reasonably infer that we have a grave problem. Cutler, however, accurately describes the problem, but mistakenly ascribes its cause to what is really a symptom. The American tendency to govern by gridlock is less a consequence of an outdated Constitution and more the product of the still-vigorous political culture that wrote it. Scrapping the Constitution, as Cutler advocates, will not change the reality of an administrative and political tradition in which frustration seems the only constant.
当这个出众的政治内行（我们假设他比大家对这个系统的运作了解的更清楚）主张推倒现有的国家宪法和政府机构，而建立一个新的，并认为这是解决僵
化的民主政治的唯一药方时，我们可以合理的推断，我们遇到了一个严重问题，卡特勒准确地描述了这个问题，然而却把问题的一个表象当成了原因。给政府加上的枷锁与其说是一部过时的宪法的产物，不如说是一种仍然有活力的政治文化的产物。卡特勒所倡导的推倒整个宪法，并不能改变经常让人沮丧的行政和政治传统。
Part 8
In the states, governors have gained executive power over the last two centuries, but by any normal criterion of management their powers remain tightly constrained and fragmented. In nineteen of the forty-two states with lieutenant governors, the governor and lieutenant governor are elected independently, and, presumably, have political agendas that differ.(The nation relieved the federal government of this strange arrangement, as it applied to the president and vice president, in 1804 by ratifying the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution.) Of the almost 2,000 major administrative officers in the fifty states, nearly 300 are elected directly by the people, and an additional 750 are appointed by someone or some body other than the governor. More than half of the key public administrators in the states, in other words, administer from power bases that are independent from their state’s chief executive officer.
在州一级，州长在过去两个世纪中获得了许多行政权力，但是，从通常的行政标准来看，他们的权力仍然是受到严重限制的、分散的。在42个州中有19个州州长和副州长独立选举，而且，据推测这有不同的政治议程（国家免除了这种奇怪的安排，因为在1804年第十二次宪法修正案批准适用于总统和副总统）。在50个州的大约2000个主要行政官员中，大约300人直接由人民选出，另外750人为州长以外的人或机构任命。换言之，州的重要行政职位有一半以上独立于各州的行政首长。
Part 9
And these independent administrators are vital, concentrating as they do on elections, crime, finances, and economics. In forty-five states the people elect the state’s attorney general; about three-fourths of the fifty states elect secretaries of state (who are responsible for the conduct of elections, among other duties) and state treasurers; half elect state auditors (who can easily embarrass a governor through unflattering audits); a third elect comptrollers (who control state funds) and superintendents of education (education accounts for over half of a typical state’s budget); about a fourth elect commissioners of agriculture; roughly a fifth elect utility commissioners or board members and insurance commissioners; and a tenth elect land commissioners. These are crucial state administrators over whom governors have scant if any administrative control.
而这些独立的行政专员是至关重要的，因为他们集中在选举，犯罪，金融办和经济学。50个州之中，大约3/4的州选举司库和州务卿（后者的工作之一是负责选举事务），1/2的州选举州审计师（他们可以通过不徇私情审计轻而易举的使州长处于尴尬的境地），1/3的州选举审计长（他们控制州的资金）及督学（教育经费一般占州预算的一半）,1/4的州选举农业专员，约1/5的州选举公用事业专员和保险专员，1/10的州选举土地专员。对这些州的关键行政职位，州长只有极少的合法行政控制力。
Part 10
Counties have even weaker chief executives. Nearly four-fifths(78 percent) are not elected by voters but by county commissioners, thereby depriving them of a power base independent of the legislature. Fifty-eight percent of these executives have teems of only a single year, and 92 percent have no veto power. A primitive form of early American government, in which the executive and legislative functions are combined, is continued in about two-thirds of the counties (in contrast to less than 2 percent of municipalities), where the commission plan is used; in the commission form of government, legislators directly administer government departments ,and there is no separation of the branches. Like the states, almost all counties further diminish executive power by letting the people elect a number of administrative officers, such as sheriffs, district attorneys, tax assessors and collectors, treasurers and auditors, and even coroners and clerks.
县行政首长的权力更弱，近4/5（78%）的县长是由县专员而不是由选民选举产生的，从而剥夺了权力基础，他们的立法机关独立。58%的县长只有一年的任期，而且92%没有否决权。监察委员会计划大约三分之二的县（相比之下只有不到直辖市的2%）继续用这种行政和立法职能相结合这样的一个早期美国政府原始形式。在政府委托的形式下，立法会议员直接管理的政府部门没有树枝分离。像美国，几乎所有的县进一步削弱了让人民选出的行政人员，如司法长官，地方检察官，税务评估人员和收藏家，司库及核数师，甚至法医，文员。